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Abstract 
 
The world market changed quite dramatically when China joined the WTO in 
2001 and fully entered the world market. It had implications for both importing 
and exporting countries, as China’s entrance on the world market increased the 
supply of cheap manufactured goods. This is thought to have caused US 
consumers to replace Mexican products with Chinese, and to have slowed down 
or decreased Mexican exports to the US.  
      The aim of this essay is to investigate whether US imports from Mexico have 
changed due to increased Chinese competition. This is done by reviewing 
previous research and supplementing it with correlation and regression analysis 
built on OECD data. The results from these analyses show that the decrease of US 
imports from Mexico does not depend as much on Chinese competition as 
previously thought. Some Mexican industries, such as the textile sector, does 
seem to have been negatively affected by Chinas entrance at the market, but the 
general conclusion is that the slow, or negative, Mexican growth cannot be 
explained by Chinese competition.  
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1 Introduction  
China is the world´s most populous country, and when it opened up its economy 
to trade it rapidly grew to become one of the most important trading economies. 
The emergence of what is today the largest exporter and second largest importer, 
has changed the world market, as both world demand and supply have increased 
dramatically. This development is particularly evident in the change of trade 
between the US and China. However, increased trade between the US and China 
also affects the countries trading with the US. Mexico is one of these countries. It 
is one of the main trading partners of the US, and Mexico itself is heavily reliant 
on trade with the US. Several observers claim that Mexican trade with the US has 
suffered because of China’s economic growth, see Kevin P. Gallagher and 
Roberto Porzecanski (2008). However, this is a statement that is not without 
controversy; Gordon H. Hanson and Gregory Robertson (2006) as well as José E. 
López-Córdoba (2007) claims that China is not such an important factor of 
explanation as claimed by Gallagher. This essay is aimed to contribute to this 
discussion with more recent data and an extended analysis of the topic. The 
purpose of this essay is to show if China’s emergence on the world market has 
affected Mexican trade by analyzing US imports from Mexico and China. In 
short, the main question of investigation is: 
  
Has China’s emergence on the world market changed 
Mexico´s trade with the US? 
  
In other words, this essay will investigate whether Mexican exports to the US 
have decreased because of Chinese competition, and whether Mexico is moving 
from producing goods that compete with Chinese exports towards goods that 
complement them.  
The essay builds on previous research on Chinese influence on US-Mexico 
trade. It is meaningful to reevaluate previous conclusions on this topic as the 
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growth of China and its impact on other economies is rapidly changing. The 
classical Hecksher-Ohlin model is expanded and used as a theoretical framework 
and base for further analysis. OECD data is processed and analyzed in order to 
give an overview of the changes in trade between the US and Mexico and China. 
This is complemented by some statistical tests in order to establish whether the 
changes that have occurred in US-Mexican trade can be explained by increased 
US imports from China.  
Mexico, USA, and China, are chosen as cases of observation because they are 
all important world economies. Mexico and China are both heavily reliant on 
trade, and especially with the US. Mexico is of particular interest, as it is 
repeatedly pointed out as an odd case in Latin America in terms of Chinese 
influence. It is thought to be one of few Latin countries where overall Chinese 
influence has been negative.  The majority of Mexico’s exports go to the US, and 
it is therefore interesting to see how an increased import of Chinese goods has 
affected trade between the two American countries. I have chosen to focus this 
essay on the period between 1999 up until now, since that covers a timespan of 
two years before China entered the WTO until now. China’s entrance in the WTO 
marks a new stage of its liberalization and integration on the world market. Before 
joining the WTO China faced high tariffs, and could therefore not fully compete 
on the world market. 1999 can therefore be seen as the world without much 
Chinese influence whereas 2011 is a world market with a palpable Chinese 
influence. These two years are compared in order to illustrate what happened in 
Mexico-US trade when China entered the world market.  
    The introductory chapters of the essay are followed by an explanation on 
Mexican and Chinese trade, in general and with the US. The Chinese competition 
on Mexican exports with the US is investigated through previous research. This is 
followed by some empirical findings and statistical tests. The essay ends with an 
analysis to bring the theoretical and empirical parts together. 
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2 Theory  
Globalization is the most important economic phenomena of our time and it 
comes with increased integration, political, socially but also economically (Smith 
et. al, 2008:2) International trade volumes keep increasing, which makes it more 
important than ever to understand trade patterns and what drives countries to 
trade, import, and export (WTO
1
: 2012). A common method for analyzing this 
course of events is to compare relative advantages, which is explained by 
numerous theories, one of the most influential being the Hecksher-Ohlin model. 
The model can also be used to analyze the trade between the US and Mexico and 
China since it clearly points out what drives countries to trade with each other. A 
summary of the Hecksher-Ohlin model is presented and linked to the case of US-
Mexican trade below. 
2.1 The Hecksher-Ohlin model 
The Hecksher-Ohlin model is used as a base for analysis in Lall and Weiss’ article 
on Chinese competition on Mexican trade in the US, and it will also be used here 
(Lall and Weiss, 2007). The main assumption of the model is that a country will 
produce and export the goods that is using relatively more of their abundant factor 
of production and import the goods that is using relatively more of their scarce 
factor of production. Here, intensively using means to employ relatively more of a 
certain factor of production in terms of the other factor of production. The 
abundant factor is the factor a country has relatively more of in terms of the other 
factor compared to the partner country. For example, country H and country F 
both produce cars and toys. The production of cars is capital (K) intensive and 
clothes is labor (L) intensive, this can be written like (K/L)
Cars
>(K/L)
Toys
. In terms 
of the factor endowments of the both countries, (K/L)
H
>(K/L)
F
. This means that H 
is capital abundant and F is labor abundant. Note that what is intensively depends 
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on the ratio of labor used in production rather than in output, meaning a country 
will not be both labor and capital intensive (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009: 54ff). If 
w notates wage (i.e. price of labor) and r notates rent (i.e. price of capital) then the 
production factor endowments for the two countries can be written like 
(w/r)
H
>(w/r)
F
. Since capital is relatively cheaper in H, they will produce more cars 
(capital intensive goods) than F, and import most of their demand for toys (labor 
intensive goods). The theory assumes that all factors are employed in the 
production of cars and toys, this means that any change of production factors will 
also change the production output. Furthermore, since there is perfect competition 
the price of a product is made up solemnly of costs of labor and capital. Goods 
prices are therefore influenced by factor prices. (Jones, 1956: 1ff)  
In order to reach the above mentioned conclusions, identical technology, 
constant returns to scale, only two factors of production and that trade does not 
lead to complete specialization is assumed by the Hecksher-Ohlin. If this is true, 
trade in goods would replace international mobility of factors of production, such 
as capital or labor. It also means that there would be a factor price equalization in 
the long run, so that labor would get more expensive and capital would get 
cheaper in (labor-abundant) F, and vice versa for (capital-abundant) H, as long as 
technology is identical, countries are not fully specialized and there are constant 
returns to scale (Markusen et.al,  1995: 98ff). 
Paul Krugman uses the H-O model to show that international trade is not a 
zero-sum game. If all parts specialize in trade the entrance of a new competitor 
can actually raise the welfare for all through increased consumption. Furthermore, 
since adjustment to new production patterns are instant and without cost the size 
of the competitor and its rate of export growth are deemed irrelevant within the 
model. It is however, crucial to keep in mind that this result of “everybody gains 
from trade” is dependent on the, unrealistic H-O assumptions. Scale economies, 
adjustment lags or technological gaps make the outcome of trade far more 
ambiguous (Lall and Weiss, 2007: 87). 
This essay is based in the H-O model but is extended to include more than two 
goods and two countries. This is possible as the model is solemnly used as base 
for analysis. In accordance to the original model, the country that can produce a 
product relatively cheaper than the other country is going to export this good. This 
would logically also be true if there are two countries exporting to a third 
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importing country. Since it is essential to be relatively more productive than other 
countries in the competition for a market, a new trading competitor can lead to 
changes in relative factor endowments and subsequently factor prices, production 
and trade. Country F might initially have had an advantage in the production of 
toys, but if the new country Z is relatively more abundant in labor than both F and 
H, it will be able to produce toys relatively cheaper than both of them. Both F and 
H will therefore start importing goods from Z, and F will export more of another 
good by which it has comparative advantages. This does not necessarily mean F 
stops producing toys altogether, but the production will decrease.  
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the H-O model is a model that is 
designed to analyze the long term effects of trade. This does not exclude the 
possibilities of short term adjustment costs that might arise in periods of economic 
transition. However, since 13 years can be a considered a long period the general 
conclusions of the model can still be applied.  
2.2 Hecksher-Ohlin in a Mexico-China perspective 
In the context of this essay it is relevant to investigate if China has relative 
advantages compared to Mexico in the production of export goods, and if this has 
led to a decrease in trade between Mexico and the US. The assumptions about 
comparative advantages are made to establish which country produces the good 
cheaper than the other, and to establish who will be more successful in 
competition with the other. Assuming China has a comparative advantage would 
mean that they can sell their goods to the US cheaper than Mexico. US customers 
would therefore prefer Chinese goods before Mexican ones because they are 
cheaper, leading to decreased imports in goods from Mexico and increased 
imports from China. If this happens there would be a so called displacement effect 
of China on Mexico. It is however possible that these effects differ from industry 
to industry and it is therefore interesting to look at disaggregated data for trade 
between Mexico and China, and the US. It is also worth noting that comparative 
advantages must not be solemnly in labor or capital, it can be land or skilled labor 
or even transport costs and tariffs. Moreover, the assumption of China’s 
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comparative advantage in relation to Mexico is also discussed in order to give an 
explanation to said displacement effects.  
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3 Background  
The last decade has been characterized by the rapid growth of China. This section 
gives a brief overview of China’s emergence on the world market, as well as its 
trade relations to the US in order to make the analysis more comprehensible. The 
economic situation of Mexico and recent economic development is outlined 
below. Furthermore, a brief review of the discussion of Chinas impact on Latin 
America is presented, in order to put Mexico’s recent economic development into 
context. 
3.1 China – From Closed Economy to a Big Player 
on the World Market 
China is one of the world largest trading economies today, but this has not always 
been the case. Up until 1978 China was a poor rural country with economic 
policies characterized by a communist planning economy. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping 
initiated extensive rural reforms which were soon to be expanded to liberalization 
of prices and fiscal decentralization. State-owned enterprises became more 
independent, which led to the creation of many manufacturing and service 
companies. (Hernández, 2012: 52). During the period post rural reform, from 
1985 up until today, the Chinese government has made vast decentralizations and 
successively opened up to trade. Relations with foreign companies have been 
promoted, and foreign investments in the country facilitated, subsequently, the 
country grew more reliant on foreign imports and investments (Risso – Carrera, 
2012: 82). In 1992, Deng Xiopeng visited Shenzhen in the Guangdong province, 
which is another landmark of China’s road to liberalization. Shenzhen is a city 
where the government had experimented with loosening government control and 
implementing policies to promote FDI and inflows of technology in the 1980´s, 
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leading to a growth from 70 000 inhabitants to almost two million in just a few 
years. Salaries there were substantially higher than in the rest of the country and 
the economic success of the experiment seemed unquestionable. This trip marked 
a change in Chinese attitude towards capitalism and made way for more extensive 
liberalizations (Thurston, 1993).  
China joined the WTO in 2001, which led to Chinese economy becoming far 
more integrated on the world market than before. China had previously been 
subject to discriminatory high tariffs, but was now protected by the Most Favored 
Nation principle of the WTO and could compete more fairly on the world market. 
In 2005 when the MFA
1
 quotas were removed, it marked another important step 
of the country´s integration on the world market. This is of particular importance 
since China is a major producer, of labor intensive goods, and particularly textiles. 
The year after textile quotas were removed, US imports on previously restricted 
goods increased by an average of 270 per cent, demonstrating how important 
joining the WTO was for Chinese trade (Jenkins et. al, 2008:235; Hoekman-
Kostecki, 2009:309).  
China’s GDP (measured in PPP) for 2011 was 11,3 trillion USD, making 
China the world´s second largest economy after the US (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2012). China’s importance on the world market has continued to increase 
after they joined the WTO and the Chinese communist regime is currently more 
economically open than India, Brazil, and United States (Lora, 2007: 17). Trade is 
crucial to Chinese economy and 50 percent of GDP comes from trade, compared 
to the US where it was only 25 percent in 2011 (World Bank
2
, 2011). 
Furthermore, China’s exports were 13.3% of world exports and 12% of world 
imports in 2011, making it the largest exporter and second largest importer in the 
world (WTO
1
, 2012). This makes China one of the most influential countries in 
the world.  
China has come a long way in terms of liberalization, but the state still plays a 
remarkably large role in the economy. State-owned companies are many and 
government controls are plentiful and complicated (Hernández, 2012: 50ff). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 MFA stands for Multi-Fiber Arrangement under which “countries whose markets are disrupted by increased 
imports of textiles and clothing from another country were able to negotiate quota restrictions”. (Hoekman-
Kostecki, 2009, p.304) 
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3.2 Mexico –A General Background 
Mexico was never as cut off from the outside world as China was in the 20
th
 
century, but Mexico has nevertheless restructured and liberalized its economy 
with a varied degree of success ever since the 1980´s. Foreign direct investments 
and financial markets have been deregulated, trade liberalized and state-owned 
enterprises extensively privatized. This has facilitated Mexico to grow as an 
exporter and producer of manufactured goods (Hernández, 2012: 53).  
       Mexico´s extensive trade liberalizations were followed by the creation of 
NAFTA, which resulted in Mexico´s preferential access to the US and Canadian 
markets. This in turn increased incentives for US companies to place labor 
intensive productions in Mexico, since wages and taxes are significantly lower 
there than in the US, which could be fully taken advantage of as trade barriers  
disappeared. This caused Mexican companies to specialize in low added value 
products produced in Maquila industries
2
. Moreover, FDI to Mexico grew 
significantly after joining NAFTA, and Mexican trade with the US increased 
substantially (Blázquez-Lidoy et.al , 2007: 57). In fact, the importance of trade 
more than doubled for the Mexican economy during the two years after joining 
NAFTA, indicating a growth of exports as well as a higher dependency on trade 
with the US (Campos-Vázquez - Rodríguez-López, 2011: 13). However, the 
expansion of trade and FDI increased Mexico´s vulnerability to external shocks as 
the economy became more reliant on trade and foreign investment which has held 
back Mexican growth instead of promoting it (Hernández, 2012: 53).   
Despite the promising beginning of NAFTA, trade growth between Mexico 
and the US slowed down significantly around the year 2000. Dominick Salvatore 
concludes that, even though Mexican exports to the US grew faster than total 
Mexican exports between 1994 and 2000, they grew slower between 2001 and 
2008 (Salvatore, 2010: 33). Moreover, Mexico´s economic development has been 
substantially slower than what has been expected of it, both in terms of growth 
and in exports. Legal constraints of investment, availability of credit to the private 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2
 The formal definition of Maquila or Maquiladora is “a foreign-owned factory in Mexico at which imported 
parts are assembled by lower-paid workers into products for export” (Merriam-Webster, 2012)  
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sector, quality of education, and laws that create labor market rigidity are 
bottlenecks that can explain the lack of growth in Mexican skill-intensive 
industries. (Campos-Vázquez and Rodríguez-López, 2011: 5).  
     Mexico mainly exports manufactured goods and between 1993 and 2010 the 
share of manufacturing exports in total non-oil exports ranged from 93% to 97% 
per year (Campos-Vázquez and Rodríguez-López, 2011: 13). Most prominent of 
the manufacturing industry are the Maquilas. A Maquila is typically owned by a 
company in the US that import machinery and materials duty free to Mexico and 
export the finished products back to the US or elsewhere. These foreign owned 
companies take advantage of relatively low-cost Mexican labor, advantageous 
tariff regulations and geographical proximity to the US market (Made in Mexico 
INC, 2011). These products can be anything from clothes and toys to machinery 
equipment and electrical accessories (Corpwatch, 1999). 
A recent study made by the bank HSBC shows that key industries of Mexico 
today is the aerospace industry, tourism, and mining (producing copper, gold, 
silver, zinc and gravel). The automotive industry is also important,  seven out of 
the ten largest producers have plants in Mexico, and more than 90% of all car 
parts manufacturers are present in the country. The report also point to renewable 
energy, software and digital contents industries as important future industries in 
Mexico (HSBC, 2011). This indicates that the Mexican production is a fairly 
sophisticated and developed one requiring skilled labor but it also requires cheap, 
low-skilled labor for assembly of some products or extracting of minerals. 
Today, Mexico is a classified as a transition economy, well on its way to 
become a developed country. It is the second largest economy in Latin America 
after Brazil, but it is also one of the more populous with its 114,8 million 
inhabitants out of which 47 million make up country´s workforce. As of 2011 it 
had a GDP of 1,155 trillion dollars. In 2011 Mexico had a GDP growth of 3.9 
percent (World Bank, CIA
2, 
2012). In 2012 exports and imports as a share of GDP 
was an astonishing 58,6% which is significantly higher than the same year for 
China (Thomson, 2012). 
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3.3 China and Latin America  
The massive growth of China means that global markets have expanded but it has 
also resulted in world market prices changing. Chinese demand for primary goods 
has driven up prices whilst prices on some low-skill labor intensive goods have 
fallen due to increased Chinese supply. These changes have been large enough to 
affect most of Latin America, but countries have been affected in different ways 
(Lora, 2007:17). A brief overview of China’s influence in the Latin American 
continent follows, in order to put the case of Mexico into context.  
       The double effect on Latin America has been an extensive area of research 
conducted by a number of authors such as Zho Hongbo (2012), Rhys Jenkins 
(2010) and Javier Santoso (2009). They all conclude that the overall effect on 
South American countries has been positive since the majority of countries have a 
complementary export structure. Kevin D. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski 
states that the main reason Latin American countries have benefitted from 
Chinese growth is because it has led to an increased demand on imported primary 
goods, which many Latin countries are exporters of (2008: 198). The increase of 
Chinese imports is large enough to viably affect the world market. For countries 
blessed with natural resources, such as Brazil and Chile, the increased Chinese 
demand for mining products and soybeans have boosted the economy. Most of the 
South American countries have been able to take advantage of this increase in 
demand and has been more positively than negatively affected by the Chinese 
development (Jenkins et.al, 2008:237). 
     However, the effect on Mexico and the Caribbean countries is more 
ambiguous. The Mexican economy is not as dependent on prime materials as 
other Latin American countries and has not been able to take advantage of the 
increased demand that Chinese growth has implied for these countries. On the 
opposite, Mexican economy has experienced a decade of slow and in some cases 
even negative growth. This has been explained by the fact that Mexico, just like 
China, produces manufactured goods rather than prime materials which is said to 
lead to that Mexico face an increased competition for US imports rather than 
increased demand. (Lora, 2007:17; Blázquez-Lidoy et al. 2007: 50ff). The 
continuation of this essay explores whether there is a negative “China effect” on 
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the Mexican economy that causes Mexican exports to the US to decrease due to 
Chinese competition.  
3.4 Background Summary 
Mexico as well as China has undergone extensive liberalizations during the last 
decades. For China this has enabled them to enter the world market and led to an 
extraordinary growth, both of trade and GDP. Mexico has also been growing, but 
to a far lesser extent, despite signing a free trade agreement with the US. 
Furthermore, there is a “double China effect”. Most of Latin America has 
experienced increased exports thanks to Chinese growth, but Mexico and a 
handful Caribbean countries have seen an opposite effect, due to what is generally 
explained through overlapping exports.  
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4 Mexican Trade 
The following section shows the state of the Mexican economy today, with a 
special focus on trade with the US. A comparison between traded goods from 
Mexico to the US in 1999 and 2011 is made in order to investigate whether there 
has been a change in the goods traded or not, and also to see where the largest 
changes have occurred. 
4.1 Changes in Mexican Trade with the US 
Mexico is, as previously mentioned heavily reliant on trade with the US, 79 
percent of Mexico´s export are shipped across the border to the US (down from 88 
percent in 1999). Mexican shares of US imports have only increased from 10 
percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2011. Simultaneously, Chinese exports to the US 
have increased with 375 percent, and today Chinese goods make up 18 percent of 
total US imports, an increase from only 8 percent in 1999. (OECD, 2012, authors 
calculations)  
      In order to illustrate how Mexico´s trade with the US has changed from 1999 
up until 2011, I have made a number of tables and calculations based on data from 
the OECD database. The data consists of trade data between the US, Mexico and 
China, in terms of imports to the US.  All traded goods are categorized into the 
HS system at a fairly disaggregate level. Values are expressed in current USD, 
which means all values are converted into the value of a USD in 2011. 
Calculations of change are total change between the two years 1999 and 2011, 
which gives a general picture of the development over time.  
Table A shows the 10 most imported goods from Mexico to the US, the two 
columns are strikingly similar, the only difference is that group 61 and 62, both 
are textile-related goods, have fallen out of the list. These goods go from being the 
8
th
 and 5
th
 most imported goods onto 18
th
 and 13
th
 most imported goods from 
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Mexico. These goods have not only become less important for Mexican exports 
but have also experienced a negative growth since 1999. These results fit well 
with previous research which, since the entrance of China in the WTO to a large 
extent has been warning about the negative impact of China’s growth on Mexico´s 
textile exports to the US. In fact, employment in the Mexican textile industry has 
dropped since the early 2000, and the sector has experienced a severe crisis which 
has resulted in several bankruptcies and massive lay-offs (Ayala-Villareal, 2009: 
327). Plastics as well as pearls, precious stones and metals are more important for 
Mexican trade in 2011 than they were in 1999. They have gone from being the 
13
th
 and 25
th
 most important goods to 7
th
 and 6
th
 in 2011. A possible explanation 
for this spectacular increase in US imports is the increase in gold price since 1999. 
Prices have gone up approximately 430 percent, leading to an increase in export 
value for gold (onlygold.com). Furthermore, as mining is one of the most 
important Mexican industries today it makes sense that it has increased. Plastics 
have moved up only one spot, taking into account the fact that commodity group 
61 and 62 fell several placements. So, Mexico´s exports to the US seem to remain 
fairly unchanged, at least on the top level, despite the growth of China.  
Table A 
US Imports from Mexico (in Millions of Dollars) 
 1999 $ 2011         $ 
1 85: Electrical, electronic equipment 29 000 85: Electrical, electronic equipment 46 049 
2 87: Vehicles other than railway, tramway 20 182 87: Vehicles other than railway, tramway 44 578 
3 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 14 294 27: Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. 38 418 
4 27: Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, 
etc. 
7 866 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 9 766 
5 62: Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit 
or crochet 
4 464 90: Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc. apparatus 9 759 
6 90: Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc. 
apparatus 
3 754 71: Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 6 365 
7 94: Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated 
buildings 
3 364 94: Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings 4 638 
8 61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or 
crochet 
3 336 07: Edible vegetables and certain roots 3 594 
9 07: Edible vegetables and certain roots 1 595 39: Plastics and articles thereof 3 354 
10 73: Articles of iron or steel 1 388 73: Articles of iron or steel 3 055 
 Note: Numbers in italics show HS-system classification number.  
Source: OECD, 2012 
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Looking at how the shares of US imports have changed in table B, it becomes 
even clearer how Mexico has lost ground in the textile industry. Seven out of ten 
of the of the largest US share losers are in the textile industry, whereas food, 
metals, ships, and aircrafts seems to have been the big winners over time. Silk is a 
surprising commodity in which Mexico has gained market shares, but it remains a 
rather insignificant commodity in Mexican trade with the US. 
The numbers in parenthesis show which ranking the industry group had in 
terms of share US imports in 1999, where 1 is the largest share and 96 the lowest. 
The largest changes have occurred in the groups where Mexico has and have had 
the smallest share of the US market with railways being a clear exception. This 
can be explained by the fact that small absolute changes yield larger changes in 
percent if the initial value is low. However, goods that had a low share of US 
imports in 1999 have increased in share of US imports, which implies that 
Mexican exports have diversified. This is supported by Robert C Feenstra and 
Hiau Looki Kee who state that both Mexican and Chinese exports to the US 
diversified substantially during the early years of the 2000´s (2007: 20).  It is also 
clear that, some goods that were very important in 1999, such as textile have gone 
through a massive decrease in terms of sales to the US. 
Table B 
Mexican Share of US imports 
Top Ten Increase in Share of US Imports Bottom Ten Increase of Share of US imports 
1 89: Ships, boats and other floating structures (94) 53: Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric (75) 
2 02: Meat and edible meat offal (89) 45: Cork and articles of cork (80) 
3 50: Silk (96) 43: Furskins and artificial fur, manufactures thereof (77) 
4 
46: Manufactures of plaiting material, 
basketwork, etc. (87) 
61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet (14) 
5 71: Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc.(72) 42: Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel good (56) 
6 
04: Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal 
products (83) 
60: Knitted or crocheted fabric (39) 
7 75: Nickel and articles thereof (96) 55: Manmade staple fibers (31) 
8 18: Cocoa and cocoa preparations  (67) 
86: Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock,, 
equipment (3) 
9 80: Tin and articles thereof (81) 37: Photographic or cinematographic goods (27) 
10 88: Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof (86) 
63: Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing 
etc. (12) 
Note: Numbers in italics show HS classification number and numbers in parenthesis show the ranking of the 
industry group in 1999. 1 being the most imported commodities and 96 the least. 
Source: OECD 
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As previously stated, the Mexican economy has been growing the last 12 years 
and so has exports. Total imports to the US have grown with 139 percent since 
1999 and table C shows that, again, ships, metals and silk have increased a lot 
along with some food products and manufactures of plaiting material. These 
dramatic increases in volume can be compared with the three most exported goods 
in 2011, Electrical equipment, vehicles, and mineral fuels that increased with 89, 
128, and 465 percent, respectively. Looking instead at which goods have 
decreased the most since 1999, different types of textiles stand out as the product 
group with the worst development. The exports to the US have more than halved 
since 1999 in apparel, cotton, knitted goods and fur. The biggest loser in terms of 
US exports is the vegetable textile fiber industry which experienced a decrease of 
96% during the period of investigation.  Railway, cork, photographic and wood 
exports have all decreased more than 70% which is an extraordinary downturn 
that shows on a clear change in export patterns from Mexico to the US since these 
goods started off being fairly important to Mexico in 1999. This is particularly 
interesting in terms of the textile exports which in 1999 were amongst the most 
important traded goods
3
.  
        In table C the number in parenthesis show the 1999 ranking of each type of 
good in terms of US imports. 1 is the most imported Mexican good and 96 is the 
least. The biggest increases have occurred in the bottom segment of the list, with 
the exception of pearls and precious stones. The biggest decreases on the other 
hand are spread out on both prominent and minor import goods. This is interesting 
since a high ranking in 1999 indicates a larger absolute change and a lower 
ranking a smaller absolute change in US imports. Articles of apparel as well as 
railway goods that were ranked 8
th
 and 17
th
, fell to place 17
th
 and 53
rd
 as US 
imports decreased sharply between 1999 and 2011. This indicates that there has 
been a change in trade between the two countries in some industry groups.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 The industry groups in table C are the only groups that decreased with more than 50%  in terms of US imports.  
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Table C 
Change of US Imports from Mexico 1999-2011 
            Largest increase          % Least Increase                 % 
1 
89: Ships, boats and other floating 
structures (92) 
 5 700 
53: Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, 
woven fabric (86) 
-96 
2 02: Meat and edible meat offal (80) 3 200 45: Cork and articles of cork (27) -92 
3 
71: Pearls, precious stones, metals, 
coins, etc. (16) 
2000 
43: Furskins and artificial fur, manufactures 
thereof (87) 
-79 
4 75: Nickel and articles thereof (94) 1 900 
37: Photographic or cinematographic goods 
(38) 
-72 
5 18: Cocoa and cocoa preparations (64) 1300 52: Cotton (33) -70 
6 80: Tin and articles thereof  (88) 1 100 60: Knitted or crocheted fabric (55) -70 
7 
46: Manufactures of plaiting material, 
basketwork, etc. (93) 
1 100 
86: Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling 
stock, equipment (17) 
-70 
8 
23: Residues, wastes of food industry, 
animal fodder (90) 
1 000 
61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or 
crochet (8) 
-57 
9 
11: Milling products, malt, starches, 
inulin, wheat gluten (84) 
900 
42: Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, 
travel good (35) 
-54 
10 50: Silk (96) 800 
44: Wood and articles of wood, wood 
charcoal (27) 
-52 
Note: Numbers in italics shows the HS classification. Numbers in parenthesis shows ranking of the goods 
in terms of US imports in 1999, where 1 was the most imported good from China and 96 the least 
Source: OECD, 2012 
 
From these figures, it seems like the exports from Mexico to the US have been 
relatively stable since China entered the world market, and in general there does 
not seem to be any great changes in what type of goods that have been exported. 
Many of the goods that were important Mexican exports in 1999 keep on being 
important today. There are however some exceptions to this, mainly in the textile 
industry. Furthermore, the largest growth, both in terms of shares of US imports 
and growth in percent, has with few exceptions, occurred in industries that were 
not particularly prominent 1999.  The continuation of the paper will explore 
whether the changes that have occurred can be explained by Chinese growth or if 
the explanation is to find elsewhere.   
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5 Chinese Competition 
As previously mentioned, China is often described as a competitor to Mexico due 
to their similar export structure and China’s strong comparative advantages in 
terms of labor costs and quality. This section is aimed at analyzing what strengths 
China has in terms of trade compared to Mexico, but also to show that Mexico 
also have some advantages compared to China. Moreover, an overview of China’s 
trade with the US will be given in order to contrast it with that of Mexico.  
5.1 Chinese Strengths 
China’s main advantage, in terms of production, relative to Latin American 
countries derives from the size of its economy, macroeconomic stability and its 
rapid expansion of transport, electricity and communications. The size of China 
means that companies can take advantage of economies of scale and 
agglomeration effects as well as company clusters when locating their production 
there (Lora, 2007: 17ff). A 2004 World Bank survey states that Chinese factories 
have the “best skilled workers and productivity quality, speed, production 
capacity productivity, quality, speed, technology, storage facilities and 
transportation” (Robinson, 2010: 53).  
China is said to be more competitive than Mexico, which would make Chinese 
growth a threat to Mexican exports to the US, seeing as they have fairly similar 
export structures (Gallagher and Porzencanski, 2008: 196). The Global 
Competitiveness report, published by the organization World Economic Forum 
supports this suspicion. Twelve different categories of competitiveness
4
 are 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 The 12 categories are divided into: Basic requirements (institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
environment, health and primary education), Efficiency enhancers (higher education training, goods market 
efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness and market size ) and 
Innovation and sophistication factors (business sophistication and innovation) 
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analyzed and China is ranked as 29
th
 while Mexico is only ranked as 53
rd
 out of 
144 countries. China also ranks higher than Mexico in most sub-indexes, such as 
labor market efficiency, technological readiness and higher education but also in 
the indexes of institutions and macroeconomic environment (World Economic 
Forum, 2012). This shows that China has far more favorable prerequisites for 
business and production than Mexico. It also indicates that China has competitive 
advantages towards Mexico in general. According to Eduardo Lora, countries tend 
to grow substantially faster the higher their ranking is in this particular index 
(Lora, 2007: 35). This could be an explanation to Mexico’s relatively slow growth 
of exports. However, as this index is made for trade in general it is not possible to 
draw far reaching conclusions about competitiveness in terms of exports to the 
US, especially since many factors, such as transports and tariffs are not measured.  
Another explanation of the Chinese export miracle is the exchange rate of the 
Chinese currency, RMB, which is estimated to be undervalued by something 
between 10 and 50 percent. This is argued to give China an unfair trade advantage 
against other development countries, making it harder for countries such as 
Mexico to compete on the export market (Robinson, 2010: 53). A weak RMB 
would increase US imports from China since goods are cheaper than they are 
supposed to be due to a weak exchange rate (Xu, 2008: 716). The latest ILO 
report on labor costs repeats that China’s export-driven growth has been possible 
thanks to a particularly competitive exchange rate which makes Chinese goods 
particularly competitive on the export market (ILO, 2012:57). 
However, the Chinese economy is not without issues. The close ties between 
the state and market makes China’s state enterprises substantially less efficient 
than they could have been. Furthermore, just as the countries in Latin America, 
China suffers from poorly distributed and relatively low quality education, high 
levels of corruption, difficulties in starting businesses and a weak rule of law 
(Lora, 2007: 37). 
 
 
 
 
  20 
5.2 Mexican Strengths  
 
In 2008, Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski claimed that there is a “near 
unanimous consensus that Mexico is losing competitiveness to China” (2008: 
186). This is sometimes illustrated by the development of the textile industry, 
which has traditionally been important for both China and Mexico. It is also an 
industry where developing countries often have a comparative advantage 
compared to developed countries, seeing as it is labor-intensive and requires 
relatively low-skilled workers (Hoekman-Kostecki, 2009: 303). In 1998, Mexico 
and China had an equal share of US imports, but ten years later China’s share had 
trebled while Mexico’s share had shrunk to less than half than what it was in 1998 
(Robinson, 2010: 51). However, China does not only compete with Mexico in the 
textile industry but also in products with higher added value, such as electronics 
(Santiso, 2007: 9). 
      Mexico, striving to keep its cheap low-skill production afloat, has had a strong 
policy of holding wages down (Robinson. 2010: 53). Simultaneously, the 
economy in China has been thriving, which has led to a relatively large increase 
of salaries. When China emerged on the world market salaries were about a third 
of those in Mexico. Average manufacturing wages in 2000 was 0.3 USD per hour 
in China and 1.5 USD in Mexico. Chinese wages have increased almost fivefold 
to 1.6 USD per hour while Mexican wages have increased with a little more than 
50% to 2.1 USD. In Chinese industry cities like Shanghai and Qingdao minimum 
wages have even surpassed those of Mexico City and Monterrey in Mexico 
(Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2008: 198; The Economist, 2012). This means there 
has been a substantially slower wage growth in Mexico than in China, and that 
Chinese salaries are now catching up with Mexican wages. Nonetheless, despite a 
slower wage growth in Mexico than in China, wages are still lower in China, 
making production there cheaper. This means Mexico´s comparative advantages 
have changed since China entered the world market since there is someone who 
can produce labor-intensive products cheaper than them. It is possible that this has 
contributed to the slow growth of Mexican exports.  
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      In 2007 Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso predicted 
that Mexico’s current export structure will change because of its vulnerability to 
Chinese competition. They point to how Singapore and South Korea already made 
moves away from manufactures and transport equipment where they were 
competing with China, towards chemical and energy products that are demanded 
by China (p.57). This may have happened to some extent in the case of textile 
industries, but it is not certain that it was caused by only Chinese competition. 
Also, Mexico is not Singapore. Mexico is located substantially closer to the US 
than both China and its Asian competitors, which gives Mexico one of its most 
important comparative advantages over China on the US market, namely 
proximity. In fact, a number or researchers have noted that trade costs are much 
more important than production costs, which in the case of Mexico would mean 
that its cheaper for US companies to buy goods produced there than in China 
despite the products being slightly more expensive to manufacture (Deardoff, 
2004:5). In 2004 Anderson and van Wincooop found that trade costs are twice as 
large as production costs on average (p.44). Blázques-Lidoy et.al. draw the 
conclusion that perhaps “[…] trade costs are significant determinants of 
comparative advantage, perhaps even more than the production costs in which 
China has its competitive advantage.” (2007:58.) Furthermore oil prices have 
trebled since the beginning of the millennia, making geographical proximity far 
more valuable today than it was in the year 2000 (Inflationdata, 2012). Trade 
costs are further decreased through tariff cuts and more efficient border controls 
since Mexico is a member of NAFTA. However, general liberalizations on the 
world market, such as those promoted by the WTO, undermine the importance of 
a this free trade agreement (Persson, 2012: 1ff). As the tariff gap between 
countries within and outside NAFTA diminishes, so does Mexico’s benefits of the 
agreement. Relatively short transport times is another of the advantages of 
geographical proximity, it takes only a couple of days to transport a cargo 
between Mexico and the US, whereas it can take three months to ship a container 
of goods all the way from China (The Economist, 2012: 5). 
So, while there have previously been consensus that China is replacing Mexico in 
trade with the US, this is somewhat disputed today. Last year the consultancy firm 
Alix Partners claimed that Mexico is the cheapest place in the world for producing 
goods destined for the US, based on  pay, logistics and currency fluctuations 
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(2011: 2). Gordon H. Hanson and Raymond Robertson wrote an article in 2006 
concluding that China is responsible for only a small part of Mexico’s decline in 
its share of US exports. They do however also show, using a gravity model, that if 
export levels from China would have stayed at the same level as in 1994, exports 
in Mexico would have been between 1.1 to 3.1 percentage points higher in the 
early 2000s (p.22). Enrique López-Córdova claims that the development of 
Mexican exports can be explained by internal factors rather than a “China effect”. 
They claim that about half of the difference in annual growth rates of exports to 
the US can be explained by the simple fact that China is growing faster than Latin 
America, rather than replacing Latin American companies on a third market 
(2007: 124).  
      China seems to have a highly beneficial business environment and does in 
some cases seem to be a better choice for production than Mexico. Textiles appear 
to be a good example of this since China is far more successful in exporting this 
type of goods to the US. As mentioned above, Mexico is expected to diversify its 
exports, which it also seems to have done. Simultaneously, Mexico has some 
advantages in terms of exports to the US why it is not clear that china has ruined 
everything. This is explored further in the following chapters.  
5.3 China and the US 
In order to determine how Mexican trade has actually been affected by Chinas 
growth it is relevant to analyze US imports from China. This to establish whether 
the imports from both countries are similar and they are potential competitors.  
      China became the world’s top provider of electronic goods and in 2004 they 
surpassed the US as the largest exporter of technology as they exported $180 
billion dollar worth of computers, mobile phones and other digital products, 
compared to $149 billion worth of exports from the US (Lora, 2007: 25). Chinas 
main exports consist of office machines, data processing equipment, 
telecommunications equipment, electrical machinery and apparel and clothing 
(Trading Economics, 2012).  
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The US is one of China’s main trade partners and in 2011 the US imports from 
China was worth approximately 417 billion dollars. Table D shows the ten most 
imported goods to the US from China in 1999 and 2011 in millions of dollars. An 
asterisk marks the goods that were also top Mexican exports that year and the 
number in bracket gives the ranking of that good for Mexican exports for the same 
year.  
Top import goods from China and Mexico are quite similar, and it seems like 
Mexico faced competition from China in the textile industry, which has continued 
to be important to China whereas it has become far less important for Mexico. 
Electronics and vehicles on the other hand continue to be important export 
industries for Mexico despite Chinese competition. Furthermore, the two 
countries’ top exports to the US seem to be fairly similar over time. Six out of the 
ten most exported categories of goods are the same for Mexico and China both in 
1999 and 2011. This is not statistically proved data, but still gives and overview of 
the situation.  
Table D 
US Imports from China (in Millions of Dollars) 
 Import Goods From China 1999 
Millions of Dollars 
Import Goods From China 2011 
Millions of Dollars 
1 85: Electrical, electronic equipment* 15 803 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery* 99 566 
2 95: Toys, games, sports requisites (15) 12 074 85: Electrical, electronic equipment* 99 371 
3 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery* 10 661 95: Toys, games, sports requisites (27) 23 733 
4 
64: Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts 
thereof  (29) 
8 901 
94: Furniture, lighting, signs, 
prefabricated buildings* 
22 708 
5 
94: Furniture, lighting, signs, 
prefabricated buildings * 
6 325 
64: Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts 
thereof  (40) 
17 471 
6 
62: Articles of apparel, accessories, not 
knit or crochet * 
3 941 
61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit 
or crochet (20) 
15 629 
7 
42: Articles of leather, animal gut, 
harness, travel good (35) 
3 217 
62: Articles of apparel, accessories, not 
knit or crochet (13) 
15 571 
8 39: Plastics and articles thereof (13) 2 736 39: Plastics and articles thereof * 11 838 
9 
90: Optical, photo, technical, medical, 
apparatus * 
2 397 73: Articles of iron or steel* 9 359 
10 
61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or 
crochet * 
2 122 
87: Vehicles other than railway, 
tramway* 
8 732 
Note: Numbers in italics show the HS Classification system 
Source: OECD, 2012 
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Comparing the ten industries that have increased the most and the least of US 
imports, it seems as if China and Mexico are growing in different directions. 
There are a number of industries where Mexican exports are decreasing where 
China is increasing its share of the US market, and vice versa.  The commodities 
where these contradictory developments have occurred are marked in bold. 
Three things are evident looking at the table explaining Chinese imports to the 
US. The first is that growth has been incredibly high during the past 13 years. 
Growth has been high in a number of different categories ranging from weapons 
to knitted fabrics. And, last but not least, China has grown the most in some 
sectors where Mexico has declined the most, but it has also lost shares in 
industries where Mexico has grown the most. 
 
Table E 
Change of US Imports from China 1999-2011 
 Largest Percent Increase of US 
Imports Iron China 
Least Percent Increase of US 
Imports From China 
1 31: Fertilizers 25 324 78: Lead and articles thereof -82 
2 60: Knitted or crocheted fabric 4 833 18: Cocoa and cocoa preparations -75 
3 
47: Pulp of wood, fibrous cellulosic 
material, waste etc. 
4 127 
04: Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible 
animal product ne 
-52 
4 
59: Impregnated, coated or laminated 
textile fabric 
3 800 80: Tin and articles thereof -32 
5 
23: Residues, wastes of food industry, 
animal fodder 
3 726 50: Silk -20 
6 
35: Aluminous, modified starches, 
glues, enzymes 
3 429 10: Cereals -0,07 
7 
41: Raw hides and skins (other than fur 
skins) and leather 
2 663 79: Zinc and articles thereof 1,3 
8 45: Cork and articles of cork 2 165 
27: Mineral fuels, oils, distillation 
products, etc. 
11,1 
9 
93: Arms and ammunition, parts and 
accessories thereof 
1 962 
91: Clocks and watches and parts 
thereof 
19,4 
10 54: Manmade filaments 1 791 
24: Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
20,6 
Note: Numbers in italics show HS-classification number. Industries marked in bold means the industry had 
experienced a large increase while China had experienced a large decrease of shares, and vice versa. 
Source: OECD 
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Table F, just like Table E, shows that China has been growing the most in some 
sectors where Mexico has been growing the least. This is mostly textile related 
industries, but also in railways. At the same time, Mexico has grown the most in 
some of the sectors where China has grown the least. However, Mexican top 
growth has occurred in far more diverse types of industries than in China. This 
indicates that the two countries are growing in different sectors. According to Lall 
and Weiss a good way of measuring a competitive threat is to look at change in 
shares of a market. If a country’s share of imports decreases while the other’s is 
increasing, the other is most likely a competitive threat (2007:87). By this way of 
reasoning it seems as if China and Mexico are competitive threats to each other.  
 
Table F 
Change of Shares of US Market 
 Largest Increase on US Market  Least Increase on US Market 
1 65: Headgear and parts thereof  80: Tin and articles thereof 
2 60: Knitted or crocheted fabric  78: Lead and articles thereof 
3 86: Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling 
stock, equipment 
 36: Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, 
pyrophoric, etc. 
4 49: Printed books, newspapers, pictures etc.  46: Manufactures of plaiting material, 
basketwork, etc. 
5 58: Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, 
tapestry etc. 
 91: Clocks and watches and parts thereof 
6 63: Other made textile articles, sets, worn 
clothing etc. 
 79: Zinc and articles thereof 
7 62: Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet 
 04: Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible 
animal product ne 
8 61: Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or 
crochet 
 18: Cocoa and cocoa preparations 
9 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc.  13: Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and 
extracts  
10 96: Miscellaneous manufactured articles  10: Cereals 
Note: Numbers in italics show HS-classification number. Industries marked in bold means the industry had 
experienced a large increase while China had experienced a large decrease of shares, and vice versa.  
Source: OECD 
 
It does not seem like China is competing with Mexico in all industries, neither 
does it seem like China is always replacing Mexico in all of those where they are. 
This in turn indicates that, perhaps, the two countries have a similar export 
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structure, and they are competitors, but China is not more competitive in all types 
of production. Even though, as China has relative advantages in some industries, 
such as the textile industry, Mexico also have some advantages towards China 
that it seems to have explored. This is primarily seen in the industries where 
Mexican industries have grown a lot and Chinese industries have decreased. There 
does consequently seem to be some sort of correlation between the imports from 
the two countries which will be investigated further in the following sections. 
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6 China´s Effect on Mexican Trade 
There have however been cases where the two countries have experienced 
divergent developments of their exports to the US. In these industries China has 
grown where Mexico has decreased and grown less where Mexico has grown the 
most. The following section is devoted to investigate whether China is the driving 
force behind the changes in trade between the US and Mexico that have occurred 
since 1999. This is done through analysis of a series of correlations as well as a 
regression model.  
6.1 Correlation Analysis 
Previous findings show that the types of exports from Mexico to the US has 
remained fairly unchanged during the past 13 years, with some prominent 
exceptions, primarily in the textile industry. It also appears to have been some 
degree of negative correlation between US imports from Mexico, and China. To 
determine the statistical significance of this claim two correlations are presented 
below. The actual data is the same as previously and is taken from the OECD 
database. Each commodity group’s share of US imports in 1999 and 2011 as well 
as their growth, both for shares of US market and for absolute values have been 
calculated. The first set of correlations is made with the share of Mexico´s exports 
to the US 1999 and growth of US imports from Mexico and China, respectively. 
As discussed above, 1999 is two years before China entered the WTO and fully 
joined the world market, which means data from this year can interpreted as trade 
between Mexico and the US without Chinese influence.  
       Table G shows a fairly week, but significant correlation between the 
growth in US imports of Mexican goods and Mexico’s share in 1999. The 
correlation is negative which implies that Mexico has grown in industries that 
were not important in 1999 and have decreased in industries that were less 
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important in 1999. In other words, this gives support to the theory that Mexico has 
changed its export to the US since China joined the WTO. But, Chinese growth 
shows an almost equally strong negative correlation with the share of Mexican 
exports in 1999. This means that Chinese exports have grown mainly in goods 
that were not prominent Mexican export goods in 1999. It supports the above 
made argument that China and Mexico is growing in different industries.   
Additionally, there is no significant correlation between Chinese and Mexican 
growth which indicates that Chinese growth does not directly affect Mexican 
exports in the US. According to this, China does not seem to be such a dangerous 
threat to Mexico´s trade with the US.  
 
Table G 
Pearson Correlation 
 
Mexico export 
share 1999 
Change in US 
Imports From 
Mexico 
Change in US 
Imports from 
China 
Mexico export share 1999 1 -0,300** -0,294** 
Change in US Imports From 
Mexico 
-0,300** 1 -0,023 
Change in US Imports from 
China 
-0,294** -0,023 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table H shows Mexico’s share of US markets in 1999 and growth of imports from 
Mexico and China in percent. This is different to the first correlation since it 
showed the goods that were most important relative Mexico´s total exports while 
table Y shows the goods where Mexico had a strong position on the US market in 
1999. Here, rather surprisingly, there is no correlation between China’s growth 
and Mexico’s share of the US market in 1999. This indicates that Chinese exports 
have been not growing in the industries where Mexico had a strong position 
neither on the US markets nor in the industries where Mexico had a weak 
position. Table Y further shows a negative correlation between the share of us 
imports in 1999 and growth in US imports from Mexico. This indicates that 
Mexico has grown more in sectors where it did not have a large share of the US 
market. In other words, Mexico has changed its exports to the US. This is 
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supported by the fact that the textile industry, which was previously very 
important, has lost shares in both US market and in Mexican production. Mexican 
growth has therefore been focused on other places. Meanwhile, the textile 
industry has been a key to Chinese growth on the US market. Chinese products 
have been cheaper, and the might have contributed to the decline in the Mexican 
imports. 
 
Table H 
Pearson Correlations 
 Mexico´s Share of 
US imports 1999 
Change in US imports 
from Mexico 
Change in US imports 
from China 
Mexico´s Share of US 
imports 1999 
1 -0,223* -0,098 
Change in US 
imports from Mexico 
-0,223* 1 -0,023 
Change in US imports 
from China 
-0,098 -0,023 1 
 *Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level 
 
According to these results no correlation between Mexican and Chinese growth 
can be detected. The negative correlations that have been proved significant show 
that Mexico has been growing in sectors that were not important for their exports 
in 1999, but also in sectors that were not important in trade with the US. Chinese 
growth shows a correlation, and a negative such, only with Mexican exports in 
1999, indicating that Chinese growth has generally occurred in sectors that were 
less important to Mexico. These results may seem contradictive to what has been 
discussed in the background, but they do match what previous authors have 
concluded in terms of China and Mexico. López-Cordova, Micco and Molina 
(2007), Ayala and Villarreal (2009) and Hanson and Robertson (2006) also 
concludes that China only explains a part of the changes in Mexican exports. 
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6.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to further examine the results in the previous section, as well as to 
highlight different possible explanations to the developments of Mexican trade 
with the US, a regression analysis is made. 
      The dependent variable of the regression is the change of US imports from 
Mexico in dollars for the years 1999 to 2011. This is calculated as the difference 
between US imports in 2011 and 1999 for each category of goods. In order to 
build a model that explains the relation between Mexican and Chinese trade with 
the US, two control variables are included. These variables are incorporated to 
control that the relation between Mexican and Chinese growth does not depend on 
another factor than those included so that their relation is purely spurious
5
. 
Independent variables include US imports of Chinese goods in dollars as well as 
the control variables oil price and US exports in dollars. Oil price is included to 
check for the theory that transport costs correlates positively with Mexican 
exports to the US. Since Mexico is located very close to the US, we can expect a 
positive correlation between oil price and US imports from Mexico. Oil price is 
not a perfect measure for transport costs since it is possible that other costs are 
more important for Mexico’s comparative advantage, such as container costs or 
transport times. The variable US exports is included in order to see if US 
production affects how much they import from Mexico. It is assumed that if 
production of a certain good goes up, so would exports of that good, and the US 
would subsequently import less from Mexico. This is not a perfect measure of 
production, but serves as a control variable.   
      In short US imports from Mexico is a modeled as a function of US imports 
from China, US exports and oil price. The model is transformed to a logarithmic 
form so that the result reflects change in percent rather than changes in dollars. 
The algebraic form of the regression is as follows: 
                          
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 A spurious relation is purely coincidental and depends on an unknown variable rather than the X included in 
the model (Westerlund, 2007) 
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Where Y= log(US imports from Mexico), β1=constant, βi=coefficient, X2i=log(US 
imports from China), X3i=log(US total exports), X4i=log(oil price) and ei is the 
random error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The regression output shows that all three variables are significant due to very low 
probabilities. The R-square value however indicates that 60% of the variation in 
US imports from Mexico can be explained by the model. US production seems to 
be the most important factor here, correlating positively with Mexican imports. 
Somewhat surprisingly Chinese imports have a positive correlation and oil price 
correlates negatively with Mexican imports.   
However, this regression is only significant if the following assumptions are 
fulfilled. 
1. The dependent variable can be written like a linear function with an 
intercept and a “random error”, i.e. the regression is correctly specified 
2. The expected value of ei=0, which means the residuals are random. 
3. There is the same variance of ei for all i, i.e. is homoscedastic. 
4. There is no autocorrelation of the residuals. 
5. The independent variables xi are not random and no variable can be written     
as an exact linear combination of the other explanatory variables, in other 
words, there are no unit roots. 
6. The residuals are normally distributed. (Westerlund, 2005) 
To check these assumptions, I first check for erroneously omitted variables by 
performing a RESET test. The H0 is that the model is correctly specified and if 
the H0 hypothesis is rejected that means the model needs to be reviewed. Since 
Dependent Variable: LOG(MEXICO) 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 1236 after adjustments 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -4.067886 0.608050 0.0000 
LOG(CHINA) 0.417700 0.022189 0.0000 
LOG(USA) 0.747506 0.025474 0.0000 
LOG(OIL) -0.344899 0.100421 0.0006 
R-squared 0.618860       Durbin-Watson stat 1.882039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.617932       F-statistic 666.8022 
       Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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the F-statistic in the RESET test is above the 1% level, the H0 cannot be rejected 
and the model is thereby correctly specified. This means assumption 1 and 2 is 
fulfilled.  
        
 
 
To further analyze assumption two, a VIF or Variance Inflation Factors test is 
performed in order to check for multicollinearity. The centered VIF value is close 
to one, indicating that there is no multicollinearity which is good since it means 
the independent variables does not correlate. 
Variance Inflation Factors 
Included observations: 1236 
 Centered 
Variable VIF 
LOG(CHINA)  1.260387 
LOG(USA)  1.208059 
LOG(OIL)  1.060300 
 
The existence of heteroskedasticity is reviewed by running a White’s test, since this 
detects any type of heteroskedasticity. Here the H0 states that the residuals are 
homoscedastic, and that the residuals are random.  The test statistic of the White´s test is 
below the 1% level, meaning the hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected, and that 
assumption 3 is not fulfilled.  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 
F-statistic 33.70518     Prob. F(3,1232) 0.0000 
       
To correct the hetroskedastcity, the White’s robust standard errors are used since we do 
not know what the heteroskedasticity of the model looks like. This yields a regression 
that is not the best estimator of the relation between the variables, but it still gives a 
correct inference regardless the shape of the heteroskedasticity since the sample is large. 
The new regression gives more or less the same results as the original regression.  
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test 
 Value df Probability  
F-statistic  3.067451 (3, 1229)  0.0271  
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Dependent Variable: LOG(MEXICO) 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 1236 after adjustments 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Variabel Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -4.067886 0.690288 0.0000 
LOG(CHINA) 0.417700 0.020993 0.0000 
LOG(USA) 0.747506 0.033308 0.0000 
LOG(OIL) -0.344899 0.102357 0.0008 
R-squared 0.618860    Durbin-Watson statistic 1.882039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.617932    Prob(F-statistic)                   0.000000 
 
The forth assumption about autocorrelation is often not fulfilled in time series and 
is therefore tested by a Durbin-Watson test. The critical values for rejecting the H0 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation is tested against the H1 hypothesis of positive 
autocorrelation. The critical upper value for the test is 1.85282 and lower value is 
1.86044 on a 1% significance level
6
. Since the Durbin-Watson statistic from the 
regression above is above is higher than the upper value, the H0 hypothesis is not 
rejected and the model does not have autocorrelation. 
The fifth assumption regarding unit roots is tested by a test for unit roots, 
showing that US exports, Mexican imports and Chinese imports are free of unit 
roots. The variable oil has a unit root, which means this variable cannot be 
interpreted. The variable is kept in the model since it is only a control variable and 
is therefore not significant for further analysis regarding Mexico and China.   
The last assumption is that the residuals are normally distributed. Since the 
sample is large this is supposed to be correct in accordance with the central limit 
theorem.  
      The results of the regression show a significant connection between both US exports 
and US imports from China.  The standard errors are relatively small which means that 
the results are reliable. And the adjusted R-squared value shows approximately 0.61 
which means 61% percent of the variation in US imports from Mexico can be explained 
by variations in US exports and imports from China.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 Values from http://www.imm.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/dateien/3_lehre/market_analysis/durbin_watson_tables.pdf 
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6.3 Results    
The results yielded from the regressions above differ from those of the 
correlations, where China did not seem to influence Mexico’s trade with the US. 
Instead, it seems like Mexico has grown where China has, and decreased where 
China has decreased. The general notion that China is a dangerous competitor to 
Mexico cannot be supported as the regression shows a positive coefficient instead 
of a negative one this cannot be supported. The positive relation implies that 
China is not so much of a competitor to Mexico on the US market as previously 
thought. The fact that the imports from the two countries do correlate can be 
explained by the similar export structures of the two countries. For example, if 
both Mexico and China exports televisions to the US, and demand for televisions 
goes up, then both countries will export more. It could also be explained by 
industry specific technological progress. It is however still possible, and supported 
by what is showed earlier in the essay, that China grows a lot faster than Mexico 
on the US market. This is expected since the Mexican economy has not been able 
to keep up with the explosive growth of China. It does not seem like the Chinese 
industry has completely outcompeted Mexico, but it is possible that it has slowed 
down exports to the US.   
      The regression indicates that there is a positive relation between the change in 
Mexican imports to the US and the change in US exports and Chinese imports to 
the US respectively. In other words, if the US produces and exports more of a 
good, the US imports from Mexico will also increase. The causality here is not 
determined so no conclusion about which variable causes which can be made. An 
increased US production could lead to increased Mexican exports if US 
companies produce more of a good because domestic and world demand goes up. 
This would in turn mean that the market is growing, allowing Mexican companies 
to sell more to US companies. It is also possible that the US exports pieces of 
goods, or raw materials to e.g. Mexico that these commodities are assembled or 
get their finishing touch in Mexico, as is the case of the Maquila industry. 
However, no certain conclusion can me made about this since the HS system of 
classification is not divided into levels of refinement. The variable for oil price 
cannot be analyzed as it has a unit root.  
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7 Conclusion 
Both Mexico and China have undergone extensive liberalizations that have 
facilitated export growth in both countries. China has been growing faster and 
more dramatically than Mexico, but both countries have increased their trade with 
the US over the past thirteen years. Mexican exports to the US were expected to 
grow rapidly thanks to NAFTA, but have grown relatively slowly, and in some 
industries growth has even been negative. Since Chinese exports to the US have 
been growing in some of these disappointing sectors, Chinese companies have 
become scapegoat for poor Mexican performance. However, the correlations and 
regression analysis made in this essay show that Chinese growth is not the 
prominent reason for this recent development. Mexico cannot be said to have 
changed its exports to the US because of China. 
The main imports from Mexico to the US seem to be fairly similar over time. 
There are however some exceptions to this where trade has changed quite 
dramatically. The textile industry is the clearest example of this, and in this case it 
is clear that production is cheaper in China due to e.g. lower labor costs. China 
has a strong comparative advantage in low-skill intensive goods, and since it 
produces these goods cheaper than Mexico US costumers buy more of Chinese 
goods. This development goes both ways and can be seen in Mexico as well as 
China, where growth have been most prominent in industries where the other 
country has made losses or grown exceptionally slowly. There is no statistical 
evidence for this, neither in the correlations nor the regression analysis. This 
implies that the relation is purely coincidental, and that there are not enough 
support for the hypothesis that Mexico would be moving towards exporting the 
goods that China produce less of. To draw a certain conclusion about this it would 
be necessary to make an analysis of all different industries as they must to be 
evaluated one by one.  
There are however evidence of a negative correlations for both countries with 
Mexican exports to the US in 1999. This implies that imports from both countries 
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grew in other industries than those that were important to Mexico before China 
joined the WTO. Furthermore, the regression showed a significant positive 
relation between US imports from Mexico and from China. This implies that both 
countries have grown in the same industries.  
From these results it can be concluded that Mexico’s comparative advantages 
in trade with the US have changed during the time that China has been a member 
of the WTO. Furthermore, since Mexico has grown in the same direction as China 
it does not seem like it is moving towards exporting goods that are 
complementing Chinese exports to the US. China seems to be more competitive 
than Mexico in general, but Mexico has some particular advantages in terms of 
trade with the US which makes it a lot more resilient to Chinese competition than 
it would have otherwise been. This can explain why Mexico stands pretty strong 
in competition with China.   
Even if US imports from Mexico have increased somewhat, the share of 
Mexican exports aimed at the US have decreased. This implies that it is now 
exporting to countries other than its closest neighbor. The single fact that China 
has grown more than Mexico, both in terms of share and percent, does not prove 
anything about its causal impact on trade. China has gone through an 
extraordinary growth process which makes it difficult to compare its growth to 
that of any other country.  
In conclusion, Mexico´s exports to the US have undergone some changes 
since China entered the world market. The textile industry has experienced a 
particularly negative development, whereas the electronic and car industry have 
continued strongly. However, the Mexican trade with the US looks fairly similar 
to what it did before China entered the WTO at large, and there does not seem to 
be evidence to support the theory that China is replacing Mexico in trade with the 
US despite the fact that China does seem to have some comparative advantages in 
relation to Mexico. This does not mean that Chinese competition has affected all 
industries the same way; it seems like Mexican textile industry has suffered 
because Chinese companies produce these particular goods, but it has not affected 
Mexican exports negatively in general.  
US imports from Mexico have not changed significantly (with the exception 
of the textile industry) since China joined the WTO. Despite the fact that China is 
a fast-growing and competitive country, it does not seem to be replacing Mexico 
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in its trade with the US. This shows that the fear of Chinese competition is not 
always rational, and that trade should not always be seen as a zero-sum game.  
The conclusions of this essay will need to be re-evaluated in a few years time 
when, or if, average salaries in China surpass those of Mexico. It is possible that 
the results yielded here will be even stronger by then. Furthermore, since China 
does not seem to be the driving force behind the changes in US imports from 
Mexico, it would be interesting to investigate what other explanations to this 
change there are.  
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